What each one actually does, and where the difference is marketing
The union’s own phrasing gives the game away. Agents negotiate and service employment contracts, while managers are supposed to engage in career direction.
That qualifier is doing a lot of work. The formal division is clean and the operational reality is not, and the honest version of this page has to say both.
Here is an agent, in print, on what managers actually do. They cannot legally set up auditions, yet will do their best to connect clients with auditions. They cannot work on contracts, but are often actively involved in any and all negotiations.
The casting submission platform used by representatives states plainly who holds accounts. Casting directors, filmmakers, agents and managers, with certain restrictions on managers outside Los Angeles and New York.
So in the two markets that matter most, a manager holds a submission account and pushes your name into the same pipe the agent uses.
The line that managers cannot submit you dominates every competitor page. It is legally coherent and operationally false, and the reconciliation is a fiction about acting under the agency’s direction.
Where it is marketing is worth naming too. Career strategy and the long game are claimed by every manager and by every good agent.
Nothing in law or union rule allocates strategy to managers. The only structural reason a manager can plausibly deliver more of it is capacity. An agent who moved into management put it best. At the heart of what we do is something absolutely the same.
The roster number everybody repeats, and where it actually came from
Agents carry 125 to 150 clients and the best managers fewer than twenty. You have read that everywhere. We traced it, and it is thinner than its ubiquity suggests.
It comes from a single Backstage column written by a working Los Angeles agent under a standing pseudonym. He is not named, the figures are not sourced, and no method is given.
Every repetition we found traces back to him. Of twenty-nine pages, five print a roster figure and exactly one attributes it.
They are not contradictory. They measure different things. The agency ratio counts clients per agent across a whole firm, where a star is serviced by a team of four and a single agent’s personal list is small.
The famous figure describes one theatrical agent’s desk at a mid-size or boutique agency, where three or four agents cover four hundred clients and nobody has a team.
And what roster size actually buys is not attention in the abstract. It is three specific things. Read time on your material. A phone pitch rather than an electronic submission. And somebody whose economics do not survive your slow year.
The last of those is the honest argument for a manager. A manager on fifteen clients cannot afford to have you dormant. An agent on a hundred and fifty can.
An agent concedes the point in print. Managers give more personal attention because of smaller client rosters. A union member who finally hired one put it more simply: more people pulling for you.

A manager can produce. An agent cannot. This is the actual difference.
Of twenty-nine pages we audited, one mentions this at all, and that one is an encyclopaedia entry. It is the single most consequential distinction in the subject.
The old union rule was explicit. An agent, or an owner of an interest in an agent, shall not be an active motion picture producer, and shall not engage in production or distribution.
The reason was stated by the union’s own president at the time. An agency stake in production creates a situation where the agents would have a fiduciary obligation to the employers of the actors they represent.
He also answered the obvious objection. The right to fire such an agent is illusory, because the average actor needs the work that agent can get.
A state labour determination held that a person who employs an artist does not procure employment for that artist by directly engaging their services.
The licensing statute reaches intermediaries negotiating with third party employers. It does not reach an employer hiring directly. So a manager who casts you in their own production is outside the statute entirely.
That is the loophole stated precisely. Your manager may not legally get you a job at a studio, but may legally hire you themselves. The determination expressly declined to decide whether the dual role creates conflicting duties, leaving it to the courts.
The benefit is real. A manager with a production arm can manufacture your job rather than compete for it, which matters if you are stuck outside the casting funnel.
The conflict is equally real. Your manager’s producer fee comes out of the same budget as your quote. They are on both sides of your deal. A legal analysis puts it as having some power to limit what their clients get paid.
Practitioners cite a custom for handling it. A manager taking a producer fee waives their commission on that project, on the principle that a representative should not be paid twice. It is a custom and not a rule, and nothing compels it.
There is a canonical dispute worth knowing by shape. A comedian sued his manager for a hundred million dollars in 1998, alleging the manager served as both his personal manager and executive producer of his show and diverted talent to other productions.
The manager counterclaimed for ten million. The parties moved toward settlement in 1999 and the terms were never disclosed.
And there is a live one. A major agency is suing a management company alleging it operates as an unlicensed talent agency and substitutes producer fees and credits for commissions. In August 2025 most claims were dismissed but the licensing claim survived. No court has yet held that it violated the statute.
What each one is contractually, which is where the asymmetry bites
The commission is the part everybody compares. The shape of the paper matters more, and one of these two may not be on paper at all.
Start with the asymmetry in a single fact. A talent agency must submit its contract form to the state for approval before using it with any artist, and approval may be withheld if the form is unfair, unjust or oppressive.
There is no equivalent for managers. No filing, no approval, no prescribed form, no mandated notice, no mandated dispute forum. A management agreement is whatever the manager’s lawyer drafted.
A handshake manager can still claim commission, and can claim it on a job you booked yourself, if the oral terms are broad enough.
And the absence of writing removes three protections at once. Your sunset clause, your key man clause and your out clause all exist only if written down.
The practical test somebody put well: if they do not require a contract, have them explain why.
One more piece of arithmetic is worth carrying. Everybody commissions gross rather than net, so on a hundred dollars a fifteen per cent manager takes fifteen, the ten per cent agent takes ten, and seventy-five reaches you before tax.
And a lawyer names the exit trap. With a sunset clause and a new representative you pay two commissions on the same money, both calculated on gross while you only have the net to pay them from.
Which one first, and whether you need both
The union polled its own members by name on this, which makes it the best sourced material that exists. They disagree with each other, and the disagreement is the answer.
The claim that a manager gets you an agent is asserted on the record by named managers and coaches. A good manager can help you get an agent so your career is a team effort, and for new actors it may be a better fit to start with one.
It is structurally plausible too. A manager with fifteen clients and standing agency relationships is a warm referral in a business that runs on warm referrals. But we found no data, no survey and no case study quantifying how often it works.
And there is an obvious incentive to notice. A manager who tells you they will get you an agent has just given you a reason to sign before you have one.
The one structural point worth adding is that a manager alone is a transitional state rather than a destination. A manager cannot procure your employment, and most management agreements require you to have an agent anyway.
Which is not primarily for your benefit. Without an agent, the manager’s own procurement is illegal.
What to ask, and what a good management agreement contains
An agent published five questions to ask a prospective manager, which is a useful thing for an agent to have done. We have added the ones the evidence supports and nobody asks.
A key man clause, letting you leave if the named person who signed you leaves the company. At a multi-manager firm its absence is a real risk.
Departmental severability, so you can leave for one category without leaving for all of them. Agency contracts are typically severable this way and management agreements typically are not.
An enumerated scope. All entertainment and related activities, undefined, is the phrase to strike, and non-entertainment ventures should be excluded outright.
Why managers are unregulated, which is not an accident
The usual framing is that regulation has not caught up. That is wrong. It was tried twice and defeated twice, once in court by the managers themselves.
Start with the state’s own review. A commission convened by the legislature considered carving managers out and categorically rejected it, refusing exceptions for incidental or occasional procurement.
Then the managers sued. A managers’ trade body mounted a constitutional challenge to the entire licensing statute in 2012 and lost every claim.
So the honest summary is uncomfortable but clear. Managers organised, sued the state to escape regulation, lost at every level, and then refused the union’s voluntary alternative by ninety-eight per cent.
There is no licensing regime for managers because nobody with power has ever wanted one. The managers wanted less regulation, and the attempt at self-regulation was rejected outright.
None of which means your manager is bad. It means the floor beneath the relationship is the contract and nothing else, which is why the paper matters so much more on that side.
Twenty-nine pages, and nineteen of them are the same table
We opened every page ranking for this question and its variants, and scored each on five checkable criteria.
One dead page is still ranking on the head term, returning a not found error. Another is written for Australian law and appears on an American query.
Grading the sources
This page corrects a number the whole internet repeats and makes a legal claim about producing. Here is exactly what each rests on.
Where we differ from the standard account
What is the difference between them?
Commonly saidAgents get you work and managers guide your career, on nineteen of twenty-nine pages as a two column table.
What we foundThe only task genuinely reserved to one side is producing. A manager can hire you into their own project and an agent cannot.
Can a manager submit me?
Commonly saidNo, they cannot legally procure employment, stated flatly across the field.
What we foundManagers hold accounts on the submission platform representatives use. Legally coherent, operationally false.
How many clients does an agent have?
Commonly said125 to 150, against fewer than 20 for managers, printed by five pages and attributed by one.
What we foundOne pseudonymous columnist with no method. Agency data implies 15 to 27, and one management firm has over 500 clients.
Is a management contract like an agency contract?
Commonly saidTreated as equivalent documents differing only in the percentage.
What we foundAn agency form must be filed and approved by the state. A management agreement need not be written down at all.
How do I leave?
Commonly saidNot addressed. Zero of twenty-nine give a termination mechanic for either side.
What we foundAgencies have a published 91 day performance out. Management has no equivalent unless you negotiate one.
Should I get a manager first?
Commonly saidYes, they will help you get an agent, asserted widely and confidently.
What we foundNamed managers do say it and it is plausible. Nobody has ever quantified it, and the person saying it has a reason to.
Why are managers unregulated?
Commonly saidRarely asked, and framed as regulation not having caught up.
What we foundThey sued to overturn the statute and lost at every level, then refused the union’s voluntary code by ninety-eight per cent.
Does a manager producing my project help me?
Commonly saidNot discussed on twenty-eight of twenty-nine pages.
What we foundBoth. They can manufacture your job, and their producer fee comes from the same budget as your quote.
So the comparison that matters is not what each of them says they do, because both say the same things about strategy and both are partly right. It is that one of them is licensed, bonded, on an approved form, and leaveable on a published timetable, and the other is none of those and may not even be on paper. That is not an argument against managers. Plenty of actors are served far better by fifteen clients and a phone call than by a hundred and fifty and an electronic submission. It is an argument for reading the management agreement with the care that the absence of any regulator makes necessary, and for asking the one question nobody asks, which is whether the person offering to represent you also intends to employ you.